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Abstract—Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set
of parties to compute a function jointly while keeping their inputs
private. Compared with the MPC based on garbled circuits,
some recent research results show that MPC based on secret
sharing (SS) works at a very high speed. Moreover, SS-based
MPC can be easily vectorized and achieve higher throughput. In
SS-based MPC, however, we need many communication rounds
for computing concrete protocols like equality check, less-than
comparison, etc. This property is not suited for large-latency
environments like the Internet (or WAN). In this paper, we
construct semi-honest secure communication-efficient two-party
protocols. The core technique is Beaver triple extension, which is
a new tool for treating multi-fan-in gates, and we also show how
to use it efficiently. We mainly focus on reducing the number
of communication rounds, and our protocols also succeed in
reducing the number of communication bits (in most cases). As
an example, we propose a less-than comparison protocol (under
practical parameters) with three communication rounds. This is
less than a half compared with the previous work. Moreover, the
number of communication bits is also 38.4% fewer. As a result,
total online execution time is 56.1% shorter than the previous
work adopting the same settings. Although the computation costs
of our protocols are more expensive than those of previous work,
we confirm via experiments that such a disadvantage has small
effects on the whole online performance in the typical WAN
environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) [32], [18] allows a
set of parties to compute a function f jointly while keeping
their inputs private. More precisely, the N(≥ 2) parties,
each holding private input xi for i ∈ [1, N ], are able to
compute the output f(x1, · · · , xN ) without revealing their
private inputs xi. Some recent research showed there are
many progresses in the research on MPC based on secret
sharing (SS) and its performance is dramatically improved.
SS-based MPC can be easily vectorized and suitable for
parallel executions. We can obtain large throughput in SS-
based MPC since we have no limit on the size of vectors. This
is a unique property on SS-based MPC, and it is compatible
with the SIMD operations like mini-batch training in privacy-
preserving machine learning. We cannot enjoy this advantage
in the MPC based on garbled circuits (GC) or homomorphic
encryption (HE). The most efficient MPC scheme so far is
three-party computation (3PC) based on 2-out-of-3 SS. In two-
party computation (2PC), which is the focus of this paper, we
need fewer hardware resources than 3PC. Although it does
not work at high speed since we need heavy pre-computation,
we can mitigate this problem by adopting slightly new MPC
models like client/server-aided models that we denote later.
In addition to the advantage as denoted above, the amount
of data transfer in online phase is also small in SS-based
MPC than GC/HE-based one. However, the number of com-
munication rounds we need for computation is large in SS-
based MPC. We need one interaction between computing
parties when we compute an arithmetic multiplication gate
or a boolean AND gate, which is time-consuming when
processing non-linear functions since it is difficult to make
the circuit depth shallow. This is a critical disadvantage in
real-world privacy-preserving applications since there are non-
linear functions we frequently use in practice like equality
check, less-than comparison, max value extraction, activation
functions in machine learning, etc. In most of the previous
research, however, this problem has not been seriously treated.
This is because they assumed there is (high-speed) LAN
connection between computing parties. Under such environ-
ments, total online execution time we need for processing non-
linear functions is small even if we need many interactions
between computing parties since the communication latency
is usually very short (typically ≤ 0.5ms). This assumption is
somewhat strange in practice, as the use of LAN suggests that
MPC is executed on the network that is maintained by the
same administrator/organization. In that case, it is not clear
if the requirement for SS that parties do not collude is held
or not. Hence, it looks more suitable to assume non-local
networks like WAN. However, large communication latency
in WAN becomes the performance bottleneck in SS-based
MPC. We find by our experiments that the time caused by
the communication latency occupies more than 99% in some
cases for online total execution time. To reduce the effect of
the large communication latency, it is important to develop
SS-based MPC with fewer communication rounds. In other
words, we should put in work to make the circuit shallower to
improve the concrete efficiency of SS-based MPC.
A. Related Work
1) MPC Based on Secret Sharing: There are many re-
search results on SS-based MPC. For example, we have
results on highly-efficient MPC (e.g., [2], [9]), concrete tools
or the toolkit (e.g., [12], [28], [5], [27]), mixed-protocol
framework [13], [31], [24], application to privacy-preserving
machine learning or data analysis (e.g., [26], [21], [31], [24],
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Fig. 1. Overview of our contribution and paper organization. We show
our new protocols with capital character. We show experimental results in
Section V for the gates/protocols with red character.
[10]), proposal of another model for speeding up the pre-
computation [23], [26], etc. As denoted previously, however,
we have not been able to obtain good experimental results
for computing large circuits over WAN environments. For
example, [26] denoted the neural network training on WAN
setting is not practical yet.
2) MPC Based on Garbled Circuit or Homomorphic En-
cryption: There are also many research results on GC/HE-
based MPC. For example, we have results on the toolkit
(e.g., [22]), encryption switching protocols [11], application
to private set intersection (e.g., [30]) or privacy-preserving
machine learning (e.g., [6], [16], [29], [7], [19], [20]), etc.
Recently, we have many research results on GC for more than
three parties (e.g., [25], [34]) and Arithmetic GC (e.g., [1]).
Note that it is difficult to improve the circuit size on standard
boolean GC [33], which is a bottleneck on GC-based MPC.
Moreover, [4], [8] proposed the GC-based MPC for WAN
environments and showed the benchmark using AES, etc. In
all these results based on GC/HE, the non/poor-vectorizability
mentioned above makes it difficult to achieve high throughput.
B. Our Contribution
We show our contribution (and paper organization) in
Figure. 1. There are two main contributions in this paper.
First, (1) we propose the method for treating multi-fan-in
gates in semi-honest secure SS-based 2PC and show how to
use them efficiently. Second, (2) we propose many round-
efficient protocols and show their performance evaluations via
experiments. We explain the details of them as follows:
1) We propose the method for treating multi-fan-in
MULT/AND gates over Z2n and some techniques
for reducing the communication rounds of protocols.
Our N -fan-in gates are based on the extension of
Beaver triples, which is a technique for computing
standard 2-fan-in gates. In our technique, however,
we have a disadvantage that the computation costs
and the memory costs are exponentially increased
by N ; that is, we have to limit the size of N in
practice. On the other hand, we can improve the
costs of communication. More concretely, we can
compute arbitrary N -fan-in MULT/AND with one
communication round and the amount of data transfer
is also improved. Moreover, we show performance
evaluation results on above multi-fan-in gates via
experiments. More concretely, see Sections III and
V-A.
2) We propose round-efficient protocols using multi-
fan-in gates. We need fewer interactions for our
protocols between computing parties in online phase
than previous ones. When we use shares over Z232 ,
for example, we need the communication rounds as
follows: Equality : (5 → 2), Comparison : (7 →
3), and Max for 3 elements:(18 → 4). Moreover,
we show the performance evaluation results on our
protocols via experiments. From our experiments,
we find the computation costs for multi-fan-in gates
and protocols based on them have small effects on
the whole online performance in the typical WAN
environments. We also implement an application (a
privacy-preserving exact edit distance protocol for
genome strings) using our protocols. More concretely,
see Sections IV, V-B, and V-C.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the building blocks for our
protocols and settings used in this paper.
A. Syntax for Secret Sharing
A 2-out-of-2 secret sharing ((2, 2)-SS) scheme over Z2n
consists of two algorithms: Share and Reconst. Share takes
as input x ∈ Z2n , and outputs (JxK0, JxK1) ∈ Z22n , where
the bracket notation JxKi denotes the share of the i-th party
(for i ∈ {0, 1}). We denote JxK = (JxK0, JxK1) as their
shorthand. Reconst takes as input JxK, and outputs x. For
arithmetic sharing and boolean sharing, we consider power-
of-two integers n (e.g. n = 64) and n = 1, respectively.
B. Secure Two-Party Computation Based on (2, 2)-Additive
Secret Sharing
1) Arithmetic Gates: We explain how to compute arith-
metic ADD/MULT gates on (2, 2)-additive SS. We use the
standard (2, 2)-additive SS scheme, defined by
• Share(x): randomly choose r ∈ Z2n and let JxKA0 = r
and JxKA1 = x− r.
• Reconst(JxKA0 , JxKA1 ): output JxKA0 + JxKA1 .
We can compute fundamental operations: ADD(x, y) :=
x+ y and MULT(x, y) := xy as follows:
• JzK ← ADD(JxK, JyK) can be done locally by just
adding each party’s share on x and on y.
• JwK ← MULT(JxK, JyK) can be done in various
ways. We will use the standard method based on
Beaver triples (BT) [3]. Such a triple consists of
bt0 = (a0, b0, c0) and bt1 = (a1, b1, c1) such that
(a0 + a1)(b0 + b1) = (c0 + c1). Hereafter, a, b, and
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c denote a0 + a1, b0 + b1, and c0 + c1, respectively.
We can compute these BT in offline phase. In this
protocol, each i-th party Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) can compute
the multiplication share JzKi = JxyKi as follows:
1) Pi first compute (JxKi − ai) and (JyKi − bi).
2) Pi sends them to P1−i.
3) Pi reconstruct x′ = x− a and y′ = y − b.
4) P0 computes JzK0 = x′y′ + x′b0 + y′a0 + c0
and P1 computes JzK1 = x′b1 + y′a1 + c1.JzK0 and JzK1 calculated as above procedures are valid
shares of xy; that is, Reconst(JzK0, JzK1) = xy.
We abuse notations and write the ADD and MULT proto-
cols simply as JxK + JyK and JxK · JyK, respectively. Note that
similarly to the ADD protocol, we can also locally compute
multiplication by constant c, denoted by c · JxK.
2) Boolean Gates: In boolean XOR/AND gates, we use
the standard (2, 2)-SS scheme, defined by
• Share(x): randomly choose r ∈ Z2 and let JxKB0 = r
and JxKB1 = x⊕ r.
• Reconst(JxKB0 , JxKB1 ): output JxKB0 ⊕ JxKB1 .
By converting + and − to ⊕ in arithmetic ADD and MULT
protocol, we can obtain XOR and AND protocol, respectively.
We can construct NOT and OR protocols from the properties
of these gates as follows:
• NOT(JxKB0 , JxKB1 ): P0 and P1 output ¬JxKB0 and JxKB1 ,
respectively.
• OR(JxK, JyK): From a basic property of OR gate, we
can construct OR by combining NOT and AND; that
is, OR(JxK, JyK) = ¬AND(¬JxK,¬JyK).
We abuse notations and write the XOR, AND, NOT, and
OR protocols simply as JxK ⊕ JyK, JxK ∧ JyK, ¬JxK (or JxK),
and JxK ∨ JyK, respectively.
C. Semi-Honest Security
Here, we recall the simulation-based security notion in the
presence of semi-honest adversaries (for 2PC) as in [17].
Definition 1. Let f : ({0, 1}∗)2 → ({0, 1}∗)2 be a proba-
bilistic 2-ary functionality and fi(~x) denotes the i-th element
of f(~x) for ~x = (x0, x1) ∈ ({0, 1}∗)2 and i ∈ {0, 1};
f(~x) = (f0(~x), f1(~x)). Let Π be a 2-party protocol to
compute the functionality f . The view of party Pi for i ∈
{0, 1} during an execution of Π on input ~x = (x0, x1) ∈
({0, 1}∗) where |x0| = |x1|, denoted by VIEWΠi (~x), consists
of (xi, ri,mi,1, . . . ,mi,t), where xi represents Pi’s input, ri
represents its internal random coins, and mi,j represents the
j-th message that Pi has received. The output of all parties
after an execution of Π on input ~x is denoted as OUTPUTΠ(~x).
Then for each party Pi, we say that Π privately computes f in
the presence of semi-honest corrupted party Pi if there exists
a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S such that
{(S(i, xi, fi(~x)), f(~x))} ≡ {(VIEWΠi (~x),OUTPUTΠ(~x))}
where the symbol ≡ means that the two probability distribu-
tions are statistically indistinguishable.
As described in [17], composition theorem for the semi-
honest model holds; that is, any protocol is privately computed
as long as its subroutines are privately computed.
D. Client-Aided Model
In this paper, we adopt client-aided model [26], [27] (or
server-aided model [23]) for 2PC. In this model, a client (other
than computing parties) generates and distributes shares of se-
crets. Moreover, the client also generates and distributes some
necessary BTs to the computing parties. This improves the
efficiency of offline computation dramatically since otherwise
computing parties would have to generate BTs by themselves
jointly via heavy cryptographic primitives like homomorphic
encryption or oblivious transfer. The only downside for this
model is the restriction that any computing party is assumed
to not collude with the client who generates BTs for keeping
the security.
III. CORE TOOLS FOR ROUND-EFFICIENT PROTOCOLS
In this section, we propose a core tool for round-efficient
2PC that we call “beaver triple extension (BTE)”. Moreover,
we explain some techniques for pre-computation to reduce the
communication rounds in online phase.
A. Example: 3-fan-in MULT/AND via 3-Beaver Triple Exten-
sion
Here, we explain the case of 3-fan-in gates as an example.
First, we recall how to compute a 2-fan-in MULT using
(standard) BT in Section II-B. In this setting, P0 computesJzK0 = x′y′ + x′b0 + y′a0 + c0 and P1 computes JzK1 =
x′b1 +y′a1 + c1. When we execute the Reconst algorithm, we
add these two shares.JzKA0 + JzKA1
= (x− a)(y − b) + x′(b0 + b1) + y′(a0 + a1) + (c0 + c1)
= (xy − bx− ay + ab) + (x− a)b+ (y − b)a+ c
= xy − ab+ c
This calculation result is equal to xy since the condition c = ab
holds. We can see that thanks to the properties of the BTs, we
can cancel the terms coming out from (x − a)(y − b) other
than xy.
We consider how to extend this mechanism for a 3-fan-in
MULT gate (3-MULT); that is, we consider how to construct a
special BT that cancels the terms coming out from (x−a)(y−
b)(z−c) other than xyz. We can obtain such one by extending
the standard BT. It consists of (a0, b0, c0, d0, e0, f0, g0) for P0
and (a1, b1, c1, d1, e1, f1, g1) for P1 that satisfy the following
properties:
• a0 + a1 = a, · · · , g0 + g1 = g
• ab = d, bc = e, ca = f
• abc = g
We call the above special BT as 3-Beaver triple extension (3-
BTE) in this paper. We can compute the 3-MULT using above
3-BTE as follows:
1) Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) compute (JxKi − ai), (JyKi − bi), and
(JzKi − ci).
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2) Pi send them to another party.
3) Pi reconstruct x′ = x−a, y′ = y−b, and z′ = z−c.
4) P0 computes JwK0 = x′y′z′ + x′y′c0 + y′z′a0 +
z′x′b0 + x′e0 + y′f0 + z′d0 + g0 and P1 computesJwK1 = x′y′c1+y′z′a1+z′x′b1+x′e1+y′f1+z′d1+
g1.
JwK0 and JwK1 are valid shares of xyz. We can obviously
construct a boolean 3-BTE and 3-fan-in AND gate (3-AND)
by converting + and − to ⊕ in the 3-MULT case and also
obtain 3-fan-in OR gates (3-OR).
B. General Case: N -fan-in MULT/AND via N -Beaver Triple
Extension
Here, we explain how to compute general N -fan-in gates.
1) N -Beaver Triple Extension: Let N be a positive integer.
Let M = ZM for some M (e.g., M = 2n). Write [1, N ] =
{1, 2, . . . , N}. We define a client-aided protocol for generating
N -BTE as follows:
1) Client randomly chooses Ja{i}K0 and Ja{i}K1 fromM (i = 1, . . . , N ). Let a{i} ← Ja{i}K0 + Ja{i}K1.
For each I ⊆ [1, N ] with |I| ≥ 2, by setting aI ←∏
i∈I a{i}, Client randomly chooses JaIK0 ∈M and
then sets JaIK1 ← aI − JaIK0.
2) Client sends all the JaIK0 to P0 and all the JaIK1 to
P1.
Note that, in the protocol above, the process of randomly
choosing JaIK0 and then setting JaIK1 ← aI − JaIK0 is equiv-
alent to randomly choosing JaIK1 and then setting JaIK0 ←
aI − JaIK1. Therefore, the roles of P0 and P1 are symmetric.
2) Multiplication Protocol: For i = 1, . . . , N , let
(JxiK0, JxiK1) be given shares of i-th secret input value xi ∈M. The protocol for multiplication is constructed as follows:
1) Client generates and distributes N -BTE (JaIK0)I and
(JaIK1)I to the two parties as described above.
2) For k = 0, 1, Pk computes Jx′iKk ← JxiKk − Ja{i}Kk
for i = 1, . . . , N and sends those Jx′iKk to P1−k.
3) For k = 0, 1, Pk computes x′i ← Jx′iK1−k + JxiKk −Ja{i}Kk for i = 1, . . . , N .
4) P0 outputs JyK0 given by
JyK0 ← N∏
i=1
x′i +
∑
∅6=I⊆[1,N ]
 ∏
i∈[1,N ]\I
x′i
 JaIK0
while P1 outputs JyK1 given by
JyK1 ← ∑
∅6=I⊆[1,N ]
 ∏
i∈[1,N ]\I
x′i
 JaIK1 .
3) Correctness of the Protocol: We have
JyK0 + JyK1 = N∏
i=1
x′i +
∑
∅6=I⊆[1,N ]
 ∏
i∈[1,N ]\I
x′i
 aI .
Since aI =
∏
j∈I a{j}, we have
∑
∅6=I⊆[1,N ]
 ∏
i∈[1,N ]\I
x′i
 aI
= (x′1 + a{1}) · · · (x′N + a{N})− x′1 · · ·x′N
therefore (by noting that x′i = xi − a{i})
JyK0 + JyK1 = N∏
i=1
(x′i + a{i}) =
N∏
i=1
xi .
Hence JyK0 and JyK1 form shares of x1 · · ·xN , as desired.
4) Security Proof of the Protocol: First we consider the
security of the multiplication protocol against semi-honest P0
(not colluding with Client). Let (JxiK0, JxiK1) (i = 1, . . . , N )
be fixed input shares, and let ζ ∈ M. We consider the
conditional distribution of the view of P0 for the case where
the local output is JyK0 = ζ.
The view of P0 consists of JaIK0 for ∅ 6= I ⊆ [1, N ] andJx′iK1 for i = 1, . . . , N (note that the party uses no randomness
in the protocol). Let αI for ∅ 6= I ⊆ [1, N ] and γi for i =
1, . . . , N be elements of M. Let E denote the corresponding
event that JaIK0 = αI holds for any ∅ 6= I ⊆ [1, N ] andJx′iK1 = γi holds for any i = 1, . . . , N . By the construction
of the protocol, if the event E occurs and moreover JyK0 = ζ,
then we have
ζ = α[1,N ] + ϕ0((αI)I 6=[1,N ], (γi)i)
where
ϕ0((αI)I 6=[1,N ], (γi)i) :=
N∏
i=1
γi +
∑
I⊆[1,N ]
I 6=∅,[1,N ]
αI
∏
i∈[1,N ]\I
γi .
This implies that the conditional probability Pr[E | JyK0 = ζ]
is 0 if ζ 6= α[1,N ] + ϕ0((αI)I 6=[1,N ], (γi)i). We consider the
other case where ζ = α[1,N ] + ϕ0((αI)I 6=[1,N ], (γi)i). Then
the event E implies JyK0 = ζ. Hence we have
Pr[E ∧ JyK0 = ζ] = Pr[E] ,
therefore
Pr[E | JyK0 = ζ] = Pr[E]/Pr[ JyK0 = ζ] .
Now the event E occurs if and only if JaIK0 = αI for
any ∅ 6= I ⊆ [1, N ] and Ja{i}K1 = JxiK1 − γi for any
i = 1, . . . , N . As the choices of JaIK0’s and Ja{i}K1’s are
uniformly random and independent, it follows that Pr[E]
does not depend on αI ’s and γi’s. On the other hand, we
have Pr[ JyK0 = ζ] = 1/|M| (independent of αI ’s and
γi’s), as for any choice of JaIK0 for I 6= ∅, [1, N ] and
of Jx′iK1 there is precisely one possibility of Ja[1,N ]K0 that
satisfies ζ = Ja[1,N ]K0 + ϕ0((JaIK0)I 6=[1,N ], (Jx′iK1)i). Hence
Pr[E | JyK0 = ζ] is independent of αI ’s and γi’s as well.
The argument above implies that, the distribution of the
view of P0 for fixed inputs and given local output JyK0 = ζ is
the uniform distribution on the set of tuples ((αI)I , (γi)i) of
elements ofM satisfying α[1,N ] +ϕ0((αI)I 6=[1,N ], (γi)i) = ζ.
The latter distribution can be sampled by freely choosing αI
for I 6= [1, N ] and γi for i = 1, . . . , N and then adjusting
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the value of α[1,N ]. Hence, the view of P0 is efficiently
and perfectly simulatable, implying the security against semi-
honest P0. The argument showing the security against semi-
honest P1 is similar (due to the aforementioned symmetry of
the two parties in generating BTE), where we use the function
ϕ1 instead of ϕ0 given by
ϕ1((αI)I 6=[1,N ], (γi)i) :=
∑
I⊆[1,N ]
I 6=∅,[1,N ]
αI
∏
i∈[1,N ]\I
γi .
This concludes the security proof of the protocol.
C. Discussion on Beaver Triple Extension
We can achieve the same functionality of N-MULT/AND
by using 2-MULT/AND multiple times and there are some
trade-offs between these two strategies. We show these trade-
offs in Table I and discuss computation/communication costs
in this section. In this table, memory cost means the number
of elements we need for BT(E). A and M are the meaning
of addition and multiplication, respectively. We assume that
the circuit to compute N-AND using multiple 2-ANDs is
composed in a tree for reducing the circuit depth. As described
later, our protocols based on BTE have intermediate property
between SS-based protocols only using 2-fan-in gates and
MPCs based on garbled circuits.
1) Memory and Computation Cost: In the computation
of N -fan-in MULT/AND using N -BTE, the memory con-
sumption and computation cost increase exponentially with
N . Therefore, we have to put a restriction on the size of N
and concrete settings change optimal N . In this paper, we
use N-MULT/AND for N ≤ 9 to construct round-efficient
protocols.
2) Communication Cost: N -fan-in MULT/AND using N -
BTE needs fewer communication costs. Notably, the number
of communication rounds of our protocol does not depend on
N and this improvement has significant effects on practical
performances in WAN settings. Because of the problems on
the memory/computation costs we denoted above, however,
there is a limitation for the size of N . When we use L-fan-in
MULT/AND (L ≤ N ) gates, we need dlogNeblogLc communication
rounds for computing N -fan-in MULT/AND. When we set
L = 8, for example, we need two communication rounds to
compute a 64-fan-in AND.
3) Comparison with Previous Work: Damga˚rd et al. [12]
also proposed how to compute N -fan-in gates in a round-
efficient manner using Lagrange interpolation. Each of their
scheme and ours has its merits and demerits. Their scheme has
an advantage over memory consumption and computational
costs; that is, their N -fan-in gates do not need exponentially
large memory and computation costs. On the other hand, their
scheme needs two communication rounds to compute N -fan-
in gates for any N and requires the share spaces to be Zp (p:
prime). A 2PC scheme over Z2n is sometimes more efficient
than one over Zp when we implement them using low-level
language (e.g., C++) since we do not have to compute modulo
of 2n for all arithmetic operations.
D. More Techniques for Reducing Communication Rounds
In this section, we explain three techniques we use to
construct round-efficient protocols in Section IV.
1) Local Bit Aggregation: We consider the plain input x
that all bits are 0, or only a single bit is 1 and others are 0. For
example, we consider x = 00100000 and its boolean shares
(JxKB0 , JxKB1 ) = (10011011, 10111011). We find these are
correct boolean shares of x since JxKB0⊕JxKB1 = x holds. In this
setting, we can compute the share representing whether all the
bits of x are 0 or not without communications between P0 and
P1. More concretely, we can compute it by locally computing
XOR for all bits on each share. In the above example, P0
and P1 compute
⊕JxKB0 = 1 and ⊕JxKB1 = 0, respectively.
1⊕ 0 = 1 means there is 1 in x. This technique is implicitly
used in the previous work [5] for constructing an arithmetic
overflow detection protocol (Overflow), which is a important
building block for constructing less-than comparison and more.
We show more skillful use of this technique for constructing
Overflow to avoid heavy computation in our protocols. More
concretely, see the Section IV-B.
2) Partial Disclosure of Beaver Triple: We consider the
situation that two clients who have secrets also execute com-
putation (means, an input party is equal to a computing party),
which is the different setting from client-aided 2PC. In this
case, P0 and P1 randomly split the secret x and y into x0, x1
and y0, y1, respectively. Then P0 sends x1 to P1 and P1
sends y0 to P0. If P0 and P1 previously obtain a0, b0, c0 and
a1, b1, c1, respectively, P0 and P1 can compute JzK = xy via
the standard multiplication protocol. During this procedure,
both P0 and P1 obtain x−a and y−b. Here, P0 finds a and P1
finds b since P0 and P1 know the value of x and y, respectively.
Therefore, it does not matter if P0 and P1 previously know the
corresponding values; that is, P0 can send b0 to P1 and P1 can
send a1 to P0 in the pre-computation phase. This operation
does not cause security problems.
By above pre-processing, P0 and P1 can directly send
x − a and y − b in the multiplication protocol, respectively.
As a result, we can reduce the amount of data transfer in the
multiplication protocol. Note that in the setting that the input
party is not equal to the computing party (e.g., standard client-
aided 2PC), this pre-processing does not work well since P0
and P1 do not have x and y, respectively and cannot computeJzK = xy correctly. Even in the client-aided 2PC setting,
however, this situation appears in the boolean-to-arithmetic
conversion protocol. More concretely, please see Section IV-C.
3) Regarding Shares as Secrets: We consider the setting
that an input party is not equal to a computing party, which is
the same one as standard client-aided 2PC. In this situation,
we can use the share JbKi (i ∈ {0, 1}) itself as a secret
value for computations by considering another party has the
share J0K1−i. Although we find this technique in the previous
work [5], we can further reduce the communication rounds
of two-party protocols by combining this technique and BTE.
More concretely, see Section IV-C.
IV. COMMUNITATION-EFFICIENT PROTOCOLS
In this section, we show round-efficient 2PC protocols us-
ing BTE and the techniques in Section III-D. For simplicity, in
this section, we set a share space to Z216 and use N(≤ 5)-fan-
in gates to explain our proposed protocols. Although we omit
the protocols over Z232/Z264 due to the page limitation, we can
obtain the protocols with the same communication rounds with
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Memory Cost Comp. Cost # of Comm. Bits # of Comm. Rounds
Multiple Use of 2-AND 3(N − 1) 5(N − 1)A+ 5(N − 1)M 2(N − 1) dlogNe
N -AND 2N − 1 (2N+1 − 3)A+ (N · 2N −N − 1)M N 1
TABLE I. THE COSTS WE NEED FOR MEMORY, COMPUTATION, AND COMMUNICATION TO ACHIEVE THE FUNCTIONALITY OF N-AND.
Algorithm 1 Our Proposed Equality
Functionality: JzKB ← Equality(JxKA, JyKA)
Ensure: JzKB, where z = 1 iff x = y.
1: P0 and P1 locally compute JtKA0 = JxKA0 − JyKA0 andJtKA1 = JyKA1 − JxKA1 , respectively.
2: Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) locally extend JtKAi to the binary and
obtain [Jt[15]KBi , · · · , Jt[0]KBi ].
3: Pi computeJt′[j]KB ← 4-OR(Jt[4j]KB, Jt[4j + 1]KB, Jt[4j + 2]KB,Jt[4j + 3]KB) for j ∈ [0, · · · , 3].
4: Pi computeJt′′[0]KB ← 4-OR(Jt′[0]KB, Jt′[1]KB, Jt′[2]KB, Jt′[3]KB).
5: Pi compute JzKB = ¬t′′[0].
6: return JzKB.
Z216 by using 7/9 or less fan-in AND, respectively. We omit
the correctness of the protocols adopting the same strategy in
the previous work [5].
A. Equality Check Protocol and Its Application
An equality check protocol Equality(JxKA, JyKA) outputsJzKB, where z = 1 iff x = y. We start from the approach by
[5] and focus on reducing communication rounds. In Equality,
roughly speaking, we first compute t = x− y and then check
all bits of t are 0 or not. If all the bits of t are 0, it means
t = x − y = 0. Although we can perform this functionality
via 16-OR, we cannot directly execute such a large-fan-in
OR gate. We need log2 16 = 4 communication rounds for the
above procedure if we only use 2-OR with a tree structure.
However, if we can use 4-OR, we can execute Equality with
log4 16 = 2 communication rounds. We show our two-round
Equality as in Algorithm 1: In this strategy, more generally,
we need dlogneblogLc communication rounds for executing Equality
when we set the share space to Z2n and use N(≤ L)-OR.
1) Application: Table Lookup: We can obtain a round-
efficient table lookup protocol TLU (or, 1-out-of-n oblivious
transfer) using our Equality. As shown in previous results, TLU
is useful function in secure computation (e.g., [14]). Here, we
consider the table of arithmetic keys/values with size L (pairs
of a j-th key Kj and a j-th value Vj for j ∈ [0, · · · , L− 1]).
We consider the situation that each computing party has shares
of the table and a share of the index JidKAi and wants to
obtain a share of the value Vj where id = Kj . To execute
this protocol, we first check the equality of id and Kj for
j ∈ [0, · · · , L − 1] via Equality. Then, we extract Vj using
BX2A (in Section IV-C). We only need three communication
rounds for this TLU.
B. Overflow Detection Protocol and Applications
An arithmetic overflow detection protocol Overflow has
many applications and is also a core building block of less-
than comparison protocol. The same as the approach by [5],
Algorithm 2 Our Proposed MSNZB
Functionality: JzKB ← MSNZB(JxKB)
Ensure: JzKB = [Jz[15]KB, · · · , Jz[0]KB], where z[j] = 1 for
the largest value j such that x[j] = 1 and z[k] = 0 for all
j 6= k.
1: Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) setJt[j]KBi = Jx[j]KBi for j ∈ [3, 7, 11, 15].
Then Pi parallelly computeJt[j]KB ← 2-OR(Jx[j]KB, Jx[j + 1]KB)
for j ∈ [2, 6, 10, 14],Jt[j]KB ← 3-OR(Jx[j]KB, Jx[j + 1]KB, Jx[j + 2]KB)
for j ∈ [1, 5, 9, 13], andJt[j]KB ← 4-OR(Jx[j]KB, Jx[j + 1]KB, Jx[j + 2]KB,Jx[j + 3]KB) for j ∈ [0, 4, 8, 12].
2: Pi set Jt′[j]KBi = Jt[j]KBi for j ∈ [3, 7, 11, 15] and computeJt′[j]KBi = Jt[j]KBi ⊕ Jt[j + 1]KBi
for j ∈ [0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14].
3: Pi locally computeJs[j]KBi = ⊕4j+3k=4jJt′[k]KBi for j ∈ [1, 2, 3].
4: Pi set Jz[j]KBi = Jt′[j]KBi for j ∈ [12, · · · , 15].
Then Pi parallelly computeJz[j]KB ← 2-AND(Jt′[j]KB,¬Js[3]KB) for j ∈ [8, · · · , 11],Jz[j]KB ← 3-AND(Jt′[j]KB,¬Js[2]KB,¬Js[3]KB)
for j ∈ [4, · · · , 7], andJz[j]KB ← 4-AND(Jt′[j]KB,¬Js[1]KB,¬Js[2]KB,¬Js[3]KB)
for j ∈ [0, · · · , 3].
5: return JzKB = [Jz[15]KB, · · · , Jz[0]KB].
we construct Overflow via the most significant non-zero bit
extraction protocol MSNZB. We first explain how to construct
MSNZB efficiently and then show two-round Overflow.
A protocol for extracting the most significant non-zero bit
(MSNZB(JxKB = [Jx[15]KB, · · · , Jx[0]KB])) finds the position
of the first “1” of the x and outputs such a boolean share
vector JzKB = [Jz[15]KB, · · · , Jz[0]KB]; that is, for example, if
x = 0010011100010000, then z = 0010000000000000. In the
protocol by [5], we find the position of the first “1” in x in a
privacy-preserving manner using a “prefix-OR” operation. In
this procedure, we first replace further to the right bits than left-
most 1 with 1 via 2-OR gates and obtain x′ = 0 · · · 011 · · · 1.
Then, we compute z = x′⊕(x′  1). In this MSNZB, we need
four communication rounds since 2-OR runs four times even
if we parallelize the processing. Intuitively, we can construct
two-round MSNZB via 4-OR; that is, we compute multi-fan-
in prefix-OR using N(≤ 4)-OR. In this intuitive two-round
MSNZB, however, computation costs significantly increase
since we have to compute 4-OR many (= 13 + 4) times.
Therefore, we consider how to reduce them while keeping the
number of communication rounds. We show our MSNZB as
in Algorithm 2 and Figure 2:
As with the above intuitive construction, MSNZB in Al-
gorithm 2 also works with two communication rounds. In this
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Fig. 2. An example of our MSNZB with x = 0000010100101101.
construction, we first separate a bit string into some blocks.
Here, we can choose arbitrary way for this separation. In
Algorithm 2, we separate 16-bit string uniformly into 4 blocks
for avoiding the usage of large fan-in OR. Next, we compute
MSNZB for each block (Jt′[j]KB in Algorithm 2). Here, we
can locally compute whether there exists 1 or not in each
block using Jt′[j]KB via the local bit aggregation technique
in Section III-D (Js[j]KB in Algorithm 2). After that, we can
compute the final output JzKB using Jt′[j]KB and Js[j]KB. All
the bits in more significant blocks than the block in which the
most significant non-zero bit exists should be 0 and we can
check whether this condition holds or not using Js[j]KB. This
MSNZB is more efficient than the intuitive construction since
we use fewer (= 4 + 4) 4-fan-in gates.
Based on the above MSNZB, we can construct an arith-
metic overflow detection protocol Overflow(JxKA, k). This
protocol outputs JzKB, where z = 1 iff the condition (JxKA0
mod 2k + JxKA1 mod 2k) ≥ 2k holds. Overflow is an im-
portant building block of many other protocols that appear in
the later of this section. We also start from the approach by
[5]. In their Overflow, we check whether or not there exists
1 in u = (−JxK1 mod 2k) at the same position of MSNZB
on d = ((JxK0 mod 2k) ⊕ (−JxK1 mod 2k)). Even if we
apply our two-round MSNZB in this section, we need three
communication rounds for their Overflow since we need one
more round to check the above condition using 2-AND. Here,
we consider further improvements by combining MSNZB and
2-AND; that is, we increase the fan-in of AND on the step
4 in Algorithm 2 and push the computation of 2-AND into
that step as in Algorithm 3: In our Overflow, we need a
communication for the steps 2 and 6 in Algorithm 3 and
succeed in constructing two-round Overflow using N(≤ 5)-
fan-in AND over Z216 . If we set the share space to Z232/Z264 ,
we need to use N(≤ 7/9)-AND for constructing two-round
Overflow, respectively. Moreover, in Appendix VII, we show
more round-efficient Overflow. Although we need more com-
putation and data transfer than Overflow in this section, we can
compute Overflow with one communication round (for small
share spaces in practice).
1) Application 1: Less-Than Comparison: A less-than
comparison protocol (Comparison(JxKA, JyKA)) outputs JzKB,
where z = 1 iff the condition x < y holds. The high-level
construction of this protocol is completely the same as in [5];
that is,
Algorithm 3 Our Proposed Overflow
Functionality: JzKB ← Overflow(JxKA, k)
Ensure: JzKB, where z = 1 iff
(JxKA0 mod 2k) + (JxKA1 mod 2k) ≥ 2k.
1: P0 locally extends (JxKA0 mod 2k) to the binary and
obtains JdKB0 = [Jd[15]KB0 , · · · , Jd[0]KB0 ].
P1 also locally extends (−JxKA1 mod 2k) to the binary
and obtains JdKB1 = [Jd[15]KB1 , · · · , Jd[0]KB1 ].
2: Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) setJt[j]KBi = Jd[j]KBi for j ∈ [3, 7, 11, 15].
Then Pi parallelly computeJt[j]KB ← 2-OR(Jd[j]KB, Jd[j + 1]KB)
for j ∈ [2, 6, 10, 14],Jt[j]KB ← 3-OR(Jd[j]KB, Jd[j + 1]KB, Jd[j + 2]KB)
for j ∈ [1, 5, 9, 13], andJt[j]KB ← 4-OR(Jd[j]KB, Jd[j + 1]KB, Jd[j + 2]KB,Jd[j + 3]KB) for j ∈ [0, 4, 8, 12].
3: Pi set Jt′[j]KBi = Jt[j]KBi for j ∈ [3, 7, 11, 15] and computeJt′[j]KBi = Jt[j]KBi ⊕ Jt[j + 1]KBi
for j ∈ [0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14].
4: Pi locally computeJw[j]KBi = ⊕4j+3k=4jJt′[k]KBi for j ∈ [1, 2, 3].
5: P0 sets Ju[j]KB0 = 0 for j ∈ [0, · · · , 15] and
P1 sets Ju[j]KB1 = Jd[j]KB1 for j ∈ [0, · · · , 15].
6: Pi parallelly computeJv[j]KB ← 2-AND(Jt′[j]KB, Ju[j]KB) for j ∈ [12, · · · , 15],Jv[j]KB ← 3-AND(Jt′[j]KB, Ju[j]KB,¬Jw[3]KB)
for j ∈ [8, · · · , 11],Jv[j]KB ← 4-AND(Jt′[j]KB, Ju[j]KB,¬Jw[2]KB,¬Jw[3]KB)
for j ∈ [4, · · · , 7], andJv[j]KB ← 5-AND(Jt′[j]KB, Ju[j]KB,¬Jw[1]KB,¬Jw[2]KB,
¬Jw[3]KB) for j ∈ [0, · · · , 3].
7: Pi locally compute JzKBi = ¬(⊕15`=0Jv[`]KBi ).
8: If JxKA1 = 0, then P1 locally computes JzKB1 = JzKB1 ⊕ 1
9: return JzKB.
1) Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) check whether the condition
JxKA0 mod 2n−1 + JxKA1 mod 2n−1 > 2n−1
holds or not using Overflow and then computeJx′KB = JofxKB ⊕ JmsbxKB (and the same for y and
d = x − y, and obtain Jy′KB and Jd′KB). Here, ofx
denote the execution results of the above Overflow
and msbx denote the most significant bit of (binary
expanded) x. We can extract the most significant bit
of x, y, and d via the above operations.
2) Pi compute
JvKB ← 2-AND((Jx′KB ⊕ Jy′KB), Jy′KB)JwKB ← 2-AND(¬(Jx′KB ⊕ Jy′KB), Jd′KB).
3) Pi compute JzKB = JvKB ⊕ JwKB.
Thanks to the round-efficient Overflow, we can obtain three-
round Comparison. Morita et al. [27] proposed constant (=
five)-round Comparison using multi-fan-in gates that work
under the shares over Zp [12]. Our Comparison is more round-
efficient than theirs under the parameters we consider in this
paper.
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Algorithm 4 Our Proposed B2A
Functionality: JzKA ← B2A(JxKB)
Ensure: JzKA, where z = x.
1: In pre-computation phase, the client randomly chooses
a, b ∈ Z216 , computes c = ab, chooses a randomness
r ∈ Z216 , and sets (c0, c1) = (r, c − r). Then the client
sends P0 and P1 to (a, c0) and (b, c1), respectively.
2: Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) set JxKAi = JxKBi .
3: P0 computes x′ = JxKA0 − a and P1 computes
x′′ = JxKA1 − b. Then they send them to each other.
4: P0 computes JzKA0 = JxKA0 − 2(x′x′′ + x′′ · a+ c0) and
P1 computes JzKA1 = JxKA1 − 2(x′ · b+ c1).
5: return JzKA
2) Application 2: Arithmetic Rightshift: An arithmetic
rightshift protocol Rightshift(JxKA, k) outputs JzKA, where
z = x  k. We can construct three-round Rightshift using
our Overflow as follows:
1) Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) computeJvKB ← Overflow(JxKA, k)JwKB ← Overflow(JxKA, n).
2) Pi compute JvKA ← B2A(JuKB)JwKA ← B2A(JvKB).
3) Pi compute JzKAi = JxKAi  k+ JvKAi − 2n−k · JwKAi .
3) Application 3: Arithmetic Division: An arithmetic di-
vision protocol (with private divisor) Division(JNKA, JDKA)
outputs JzKA, where z = bND c. We can improve the round
complexity of Division since it calls Overflow and Rightshift
many times as subroutines. Due to the lack of space, we omit
the concrete construction of Division in this paper (see [5]).
C. Boolean-to-Arithmetic Conversion Protocol and Extensions
A boolean-to-arithmetic conversion protocol (B2A(JxKB))
outputs JzKA, where z = x. In (1-bit) boolean shares, there are
four cases; that is, (JxKB0 , JxKB1 ) = (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1).
Even if we consider these boolean shares as arithmetic ones,
it works well in the first three cases; that is, 0 ⊕ 0 = 0 + 0,
0 ⊕ 1 = 0 + 1, and 1 ⊕ 0 = 1 + 0. However, 1 ⊕ 1 6= 1 + 1
and we have to correct the output of this case. Based on this
idea and the technique in Section III-D (regarding shares as
secrets), [5] proposed the construction of B2A as follows:
1) P0 sets Jx′KA0 = JxKB0 and Jx′′KA0 = 0.
2) P1 sets Jx′KA1 = 0 and Jx′′KA1 = JxKB1 .
3) Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) computeJxKA = Jx′KA + Jx′′KA − 2 · 2-MULT(Jx′KA, Jx′′KA).
In this protocol, we use a standard arithmetic multiplication
protocol and need one communication round. In the setting
of client-aided 2PC, however, B2A satisfies the condition that
input party is equal to the computing party. Therefore, we can
apply the techniques in Section III-D (partial disclosure of BT)
and construct more efficient B2A as in Algorithm 4:
Although the number of communication rounds is the same
as in [5], our protocol is more efficient in the following points:
1) The data transfer in online phase is reduced from 2n-
bits to n-bits. In the previous protocol, we need to
send 2n-bits to each other since we have to execute
the (standard) arithmetic multiplication protocol. In
our protocol, however, P0 and P1 only need to send
(JxKB0 − a) and (JxKB1 − b), respectively.
2) Pre-computation becomes more efficient. First, the
number of randomnesses we need in pre-computation
is reduced from five to three. In the previous protocol
the client chooses two randomnesses a, b, computes
c = ab, and splits three values (a, b, c) into shares
using three randomnesses. In our protocol, on the
other hand, the client does not need to split a and b.
Second, the data amount for sending from the client
to P0 and P1 is reduced from 3n-bits to 2n-bits. In
our protocol, the client only needs to send (a, c0) and
(b, c1) to P0 and P1, respectively.
1) Extension 1: JbKB × JxKA = JbxKA: We usually need
to compute the multiplication of a boolean share JbKB and
an arithmetic one JxKA (e.g., TLU in Section IV-A1, ReLU
function in neural networks). We call this protocol BX2A in
this paper. [24] proposed one-round BX2A under the (2, 3)-
replicated SS, such construction in 2PC has not been known.
By almost the same idea as B2A, we can construct one-
round BX2A in 2PC by computing Jbx− 2 · b0b1xKA. More
concretely,
1) Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) set JbKAi = JbKBi .
2) P0 sets Jb′KA0 = JbKB0 and Jb′′KA0 = 0, and. P1 setsJb′KA1 = 0 and Jb′′KA1 = JbKB1 .
3) Pi computeJsKAi ← 2-MULT(JbKA, JxKA)JtKAi ← 3-MULT(Jb′KA, Jb′′KA, JxKA).
4) Pi computes JzKAi = JsKAi − 2 · JtKAi .
2) Extension 2: JbKB × JcKB = JbcKA: Almost the same
idea as BX2A, we can compute JbKB × JcKB = JbcKA (BC2A)
with one communication round. We use this protocol in
3-Argmax/3-Argmin in Section IV-D. We can construct one-
round BC2A by computingJbc− 2b0b1 − 2c0c1 + 2b0c0b1c1 + 2b0c0b1c1KA.
We need 2/4-MULT for this protocol.
3) Extension 3: JbKB × JcKB × JxKA = JbcxKA: Almost
the same idea as the above protocols, we can also computeJbKB×JcKB×JxKA = JbcKA (BCX2A) with one communication
round. We use this protocol in Max/Min in Section IV-D. We
can construct one-round BC2A by computingJbcx− 2b0b1x− 2c0c1x+ 2b0c0b1c1x+ 2b0c0b1c1xKA.
We need 3/5-MULT for this protocol.
D. The Maximum Value Extraction Protocol and Extensions
The maximum value extraction protocol Max(JxKA) out-
puts JzKA, where z is the largest value in x. We first explain
the case of Max for three elements (3-Max), which is used
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Algorithm 5 Our Proposed 3-Max
Functionality: JzKA ← Max(JxKA)
Ensure: JzKA, where z is the largest element in x.
1: Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) parallelly computeJc01KB ← Comparison(Jx[0]KA, Jx[1]KA),Jc02KB ← Comparison(Jx[0]KA, Jx[2]KA), andJc12KB ← Comparison(Jx[1]KA, Jx[2]KA).
2: Pi set Jc10KBi = ¬Jc01KBi , Jc20KBi = ¬Jc02KBi , andJc21KBi = ¬Jc12KBi .
3: Pi parallelly computeJt[0]KAi ← BCX2A(Jc10KB, Jc20KB, Jx[0]KA),Jt[1]KAi ← BCX2A(Jc01KB, Jc21KB, Jx[1]KA), andJt[2]KAi ← BCX2A(Jc02KB, Jc12KB, Jx[2]KA).
4: Pi compute JzKAi = Σ2j=0Jt[j]KAi .
5: return JzKA.
for computing edit distance, etc. We denote a j-th element of
x as x[j]; that is, x = [x[0], x[1], x[2]].
We start from a standard tournament-based construction.
We can extract the larger value among x[0] and x[1] as follows:
1) Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) computeJcKB ← Comparison(Jx[0]KA, Jx[1]KA).
2) Pi compute JcKA ← B2A(JcKB).
3) Pi computeJx′KA = JcKA · (Jx[1]KA − Jx[0]KA) + Jx[0]KA.
If the condition x[0] < x[1] holds, x′ = x[1]. Otherwise, x′ =
x[0]. By repeating the above procedure once more using Jx′KA
and Jx[2]KA, we can extract the maximum value among x. In
this strategy, we need 16 (= (6 + 1 + 1)× 2) communication
rounds, and 8 (= (3 + 1)× 2) communication rounds even if
we apply our three-round Comparison (in Section IV-B1) and
BX2A (in Section IV-C1). This is mainly because we cannot
parallelly execute Comparison. To solve this disadvantage, we
first check the magnitude relationship for all elements using
Comparison. Then we extract the maximum value. Based on
these ideas, we show our 3-Max as in Algorithm 5: Although
the computation costs obviously increased, this is four-round
3-Max by applying our Comparison and BCX2A.
1) Extension 1: The Minimum Value Extraction Protocol:
We can easily convert Max into Min by replacing the input
order in step 1 in Algorithm 5 and obtain the minimum value
extraction protocol for three elements (3-Min). We use this
3-Min for executing privacy-preserving exact edit distance
protocol in Section V-C.
2) Extension 2: Argmax and Argmin: We can easily obtain
Argmax/Argmin) by modifying Max/Min) as follows:
1) We replace Jt[j]KA ← BCX2A(J∗KB, J∗∗KB, JxKA)
in Algorithm 5 by Jt′[j]KA ← BC2A(J∗KB, J∗∗KB).
2) Pi compute JzKAi = Σ2j=0(j · Jt′[j]KAi ) in the step 4
in Algorithm 5, .
We can execute Argmax/Argmin with three communication
rounds. We need fewer communication bits since we can avoid
using BCX2A in these protocols. Note that in the above step
2), we need no interaction between computing parties since j
is public.
3) Extension 3: N-Max/Min for N > 3: Even in the
cases of Max/Min for four or more elements, we can construct
round-efficient Max/Min with the same strategy as in Algo-
rithm 5. However, there are two points of notice as follows:
1) In N-Max/Min, we need to (parallelly) execute
Comparison N(N−1)2 times. In the tournament-based
strategy, we only need to execute Comparison
for dlogNe times; that is, in our protocols, compu-
tation costs and the amount of communication bits
rapidly increase with respect to N .
2) For large N , we cannot directly use BCX2A (or
BC2A). Although we can construct the protocol likeJbcdxKA = JbKB × JcKB × JdKB × JxKA, we can easily
imagine that the computation costs we need for such
a protocol increase drastically. To avoid such a dis-
advantage, we should split the step 3 in Algorithm 5
into some other protocols (e.g., (N − 1)-AND and
BX2A). This means we need more communication
rounds to execute N-Max/Min for large N .
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We demonstrate the practicality of our arithmetic/boolean
gates and protocols. We implemented 2PC simulators and per-
formed all benchmarks on a single laptop computer with Intel
Core i7-6700K 4.00GHz and 64GB RAM. We implemented
simulators using Python 3.7 with Numpy v1.16.2 and vector-
ized all gates/protocols. We employ standard os.urandom
function to perform cryptographic randomness generation in
our experiments. We assumed 10MB/s (= 80000bits/ms)
bandwidth and 40ms RTT latency as typical WAN settings.
We calculated the data transfer time (DTT) and communication
latency (CL) as follows:
DTT (ms) =
(# of comm. bits)
80000
CL (ms) = 40× (# of comm. rounds)
We adopted the client-aided model; that is, we assumed
in our experiments that clients generate BTE in their local
environment without using HE/OT.
A. Performance of Basic Gates
Here we show experimental results on N-AND. We set
N = [2, · · · , 9] and 1 to 106(= 1000000) batch in our exper-
iments. Here we show the experimental results on the cases
of 1/1000/1000000 batch. The experimental results on other
cases (10/100/10000/100000 batch) are in Appendix VIII.
The results are as in Table II and Figure 3: We find
1) the pre-computation time, online computation time,
and data transfer time are exponentially growing up
with respect to N .
2) the dominant part in online total execution time is
WAN latency especially in the case of small batch.
If we compute N(> 2)-AND using multiple 2-AND gates,
we need two or more communication rounds. Therefore, our
scheme is especially suitable for the 2PC with relatively small
batch (e.g., ≤ 105) as it yields low WAN latency.
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pre-comp. online comp. # of comm. data trans. # of comm. comm. online total
time (ms) time (ms) bits (bit) time (ms) rounds latency (ms) exec. time (ms)
0.015 0.019 2 2.5× 10−5 1 40 40.0
2-AND 2.39 0.033 2× 103 2.5× 10−2 1 40 40.1
2439 19.4 2× 106 25.0 1 40 84.4
0.041 0.032 3 3.75× 10−5 1 40 40.0
3-AND 4.80 0.053 3× 103 3.75× 10−2 1 40 40.1
4899 33.1 3× 106 37.5 1 40 110.6
0.067 0.055 4 5.0× 10−5 1 40 40.1
4-AND 9.04 0.091 4× 103 5.0× 10−2 1 40 40.1
9383 62.8 4× 106 50.0 1 40 152.8
0.11 0.089 5 6.25× 10−5 1 40 40.1
5-AND 17.2 0.16 5× 103 6.25× 10−2 1 40 40.2
17700 111.7 5× 106 62.5 1 40 214.2
0.20 0.16 6 7.5× 10−5 1 40 40.2
6-AND 33.0 0.28 6× 103 7.5× 10−2 1 40 40.4
34059 203.0 6× 106 75.0 1 40 318.0
0.38 0.32 7 8.75× 10−5 1 40 40.3
7-AND 64.3 0.53 7× 103 8.75× 10−2 1 40 40.6
66123 370.8 7× 106 87.5 1 40 498.3
0.76 0.64 8 1.0× 10−4 1 40 40.6
8-AND 125.1 1.06 8× 103 1.0× 10−1 1 40 41.2
129553 700.7 8× 106 100.0 1 40 840.7
1.63 1.39 9 1.125× 10−4 1 40 41.4
9-AND 245.2 2.25 9× 103 1.125× 10−1 1 40 42.4
255847 1346 9× 106 112.5 1 40 1498.5
TABLE II. EVALUATION ON N-AND WITH 1(UPPER)/1000(MIDDLE)/1000000(LOWER) BATCH.
B. Performance of Our Protocols
Here we show experimental results on our proposed proto-
cols (Equality, Comparison, and 3-Max). We implemented the
baseline protocols [5] and our proposed ones in Section IV.
Same as the evaluation of N-AND, we here show the results
over Z232 with 1/1000/1000000 batch in our experiments.
Other results (protocols over Z216 , Z264 , and Z232 with other
batch sizes) are in Appendix VIII. The results are as in
Table III (1 batch), Table IV (1000 batch), Table V (1000000
batch), Figure 4 (relations between batch size and online
execution time), and Figure 5 (throughput of baseline/our pro-
tocols): Same as the cases with N-AND, WAN latency is the
dominant part of the online total execution time. In relatively
small batch (≤ 104), all our protocols are faster than baseline
ones in the online total execution time since ours require fewer
communication rounds. For example in Comparison with 1
batch, we need more online computation time than the baseline
one (0.54ms → 2.1ms). However, communication costs of
our Comparison are smaller than baseline one (the number of
communication rounds: 7→ 3, the number of communication
bits: 970→ 712). As a result, our Comparison is 56.1% faster
than baseline one (280.6ms→ 122.1ms) in our WAN settings.
As already mentioned, our protocols are not suitable for a
(extremely) large batch since the computation cost is larger
than baseline ones. However, our experiments show that our
protocol achieves higher throughput if the unit time is shorter
than 1s.
C. Privacy-Preserving (Exact) Edit Distance
We implemented a privacy-preserving edit distance proto-
col using our protocols (Equality, B2A, and 3-Min). Unlike
many previous works on approximate edit distance, here we
consider the exact edit distance.. We computed an edit distance
between two length-L genome strings (S0 and S1) via standard
dynamic programming (DP). It appears four characters in the
strings; that is, A, T, G, and C. In DP-matrix, we fill the cell
x[i][j] by the following rule:
x[i][j] = 3-Min([x[i−1][j]+1, x[i][j−1]+1, x[i−1][j−1]+e])
Here, e = 0 if the condition S0[i] = S1[j] holds, and otherwise
e = 1. We can compute e using Equality (two rounds) and
B2A (one round). To reduce the total online execution time,
we calculate the edit distance as follows:
1) To reduce the total communication rounds, we par-
allelly compute e for all cells and store them in
advance. Thanks to this procedure, we can avoid
calculating e every time when we fill cells. We only
need three communication rounds for this step.
2) Diagonal cells in DP-matrix are independent with
each other. Therefore, we can parallelly compute
these cells x[d][0], x[d − 1][1], · · · , x[0][d] (for each
d) to reduce the communication rounds.
By applying the above techniques, we can compute exact edit
distance for two length-L two strings with 3 + 4(2L − 1) =
(8L−1) communication rounds. We used the arithmetic shares
and protocols over Z216 in our experiments. The experimental
results are as in Table VI and Figure 6: As we can see from
the experimental results, most of the online total execution
time is occupied by the communication latency; that is, GC-
based approaches may be much faster than SS-based one in
WAN environments. However, if we would like to compute
edit distances between many strings at the same time (e.g., the
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Fig. 3. Relations between N (fan-in number), batch size, and online computation time for N-AND: we show the relations between N and online computation
time with 1/1000/1000000 batch (left), and show the relations between batch size and online computation time for 2/4/8-AND (right).
pre-comp. online comp. # of comm. data trans. # of comm. comm. online total
time (ms) time (ms) bits (bit) time (ms) rounds latency (ms) exec. time (ms)
Equality 0.15 0.18 62 7.75× 10−4 5 200 200.2
0.76 0.52 38 4.75× 10−4 2 80 80.5
Comparison 1.5 0.54 970 1.21× 10−2 7 280 280.6
3.9 2.1 712 8.9× 10−3 3 120 122.1
3-Max 3.1 1.2 2196 2.75× 10−2 18 720 721.2
9.7 2.3 3960 4.95× 10−2 4 160 162.3
TABLE III. EVALUATION ON THE BASELINE(UPPER) AND OUR(LOWER) PROTOCOLS OVER Z232 WITH 1 BATCH.
pre-comp. online comp. # of comm. data trans. # of comm. comm. online total
time (ms) time (ms) bits (bit) time (ms) rounds latency (ms) exec. time (ms)
Equality 74.7 0.61 62× 103 0.78 5 200 201.4
500.5 1.1 38× 103 0.48 2 80 80.9
Comparison 1398 8.25 970× 103 12.1 7 280 300.4
2745 11.6 712× 103 8.9 3 120 140.5
3-Max 2891 17.5 2196× 103 27.5 18 720 765.0
8635 36.3 3960× 103 49.5 4 160 245.8
TABLE IV. EVALUATION ON THE BASELINE(UPPER) AND OUR(LOWER) PROTOCOLS OVER Z232 WITH 1000 BATCH.
situation that the client has one string and the server has 1000
strings, and the client would like to compute edit distances
between client’s string and all of server’s strings), SS-based
approach will be much faster than GC-based one.
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pre-comp. online comp. # of comm. data trans. # of comm. comm. online total
time (ms) time (ms) bits (bit) time (ms) rounds latency (ms) exec. time (ms)
Equality 77574 761.4 62× 106 780 5 200 1741
500617 1233 38× 106 480 2 80 1793
Comparison 1445847 13895 970× 106 12100 7 280 26275
2799437 20748 712× 106 8900 3 120 29768
3-Max 2956155 28252 2196× 106 27500 18 720 56472
8571664 69935 3960× 106 49500 4 160 119595
TABLE V. EVALUATION ON THE BASELINE(UPPER) AND OUR(LOWER) PROTOCOLS OVER Z232 WITH 1000000 BATCH.
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Fig. 4. Relations between batch size and online computation/execution time of the protocols over Z232 : we show the relations between batch size and online
execution time of our protocols (left), and show the comparisons of baseline/our protocols with 1/10/100/1000/10000 batch (right).
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Here we discuss our schemes and their limitations, and
show some future works.
A. On the Pre-Computation
As shown in the tables on our experiments, we need
heavy pre-computation in our schemes. We investigate the
reason of this problem and find that it is almost because
of the randomness generation. That is, we can shorten the
pre-computation time by adopting hardware acceleration (e.g.,
fixed-key AES-NI) to generate cryptographic randomness. We
did not employ such acceleration in our experiments since we
focus on the online execution time in this paper. However,
we cannot improve the heavy memory costs we need for our
protocols even if we adopt the above acceleration. Achieving
both memory/communication-efficient two-party protocols is
an interesting future work.
B. A Trade-Off Between the Number of Communciation
Rounds/Bits
There sometimes exists a trade-off between the number of
communication rounds and communication bits. In 3-Max, for
example, we showed the round-optimized 3-Max protocol in
Section IV. The number of communication bits we need for
this protocol is slightly large since our BCX2A protocol uses
12
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Fig. 5. Throughput of baseline/our protocols over Z232 : 0 means we cannot finish the protocol within that unit time (since sum of latency is larger than it).
string pre-comp. online comp. data trans. comm. online total
length time (s) time (s) time (s) latency (s) exec. time (s)
4 0.04 0.01 4.0× 10−4 1.24 1.25
8 0.14 0.02 1.4× 10−3 2.52 2.54
16 0.57 0.04 5.7× 10−3 5.08 5.13
32 2.2 0.10 2.3× 10−2 10.2 10.3
64 8.1 0.22 9.2× 10−2 20.4 20.7
128 33.4 0.54 3.7× 10−1 40.9 41.8
256 135.7 1.5 1.5 84.9 84.9
512 534.1 4.8 5.9 163.8 174.5
1024 2262 16.0 23.4 327.6 367.0
TABLE VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF PRIVACY-PRESERVING EXACT EDIT DISTANCE WITH 2`-LENGTH TWO STRINGS (` = [2, · · · , 10]).
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Fig. 6. Online execution time to compute exact edit distance in a privacy-
preserving manner using our protocols.
high-cost 3/5-MULT as building blocks. By replacing BCX2A
with (2-AND + BX2A) or (2-AND + B2A + 2-MULT), we
can easily obtain five/six-round variants with fewer commu-
nication bits. More concretely, we can construct three 3-Max
protocols with the properties as in table VII: As shown in
our experimental results, we should use the round-optimized
protocol when the batch size is relatively small. In the case of
a large batch, however, the protocol with fewer communication
bits is more efficient in total.
C. On the Cases with a Large Batch
As shown in Figure 5, our protocols achieve higher
throughput than the previous result in WAN settings when unit
# of comm. # of comm.
bits (bit) rounds
3960 4
3-Max 2622 5
2430 6
TABLE VII. TRADE-OFF BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF COMMUNICATION
ROUNDS/BITS IN OUR 3-Max PROTOCOLS.
time is shorter than 1s. In a large batch (e.g., > 106), however,
we need more time to execute our protocols than previous ones
since the computation cost of our protocols is more expen-
sive. In this situation, the effect of reducing communication
rounds is small on the whole online performance. Develop-
ing communication-efficient protocols without expanding the
computation cost is also an interesting future work. Moreover,
we should consider implementation-level speeding up in MPC
with a large batch. In a GC-based approach, there is a result on
MPC using GPU [15]. We may also improve the computation
time of SS-based MPC using the similar approach.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research and development work was supported by
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and JST
CREST JPMJCR19F6.
REFERENCES
[1] B. Applebaum, Y. Ishai, and E. Kushilevitz, “How to garble arithmetic
circuits,” SIAM J. Comput., vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 905–929, 2014. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1137/120875193
13
[2] T. Araki, J. Furukawa, Y. Lindell, A. Nof, and K. Ohara,
“High-throughput semi-honest secure three-party computation with
an honest majority,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Vienna,
Austria, October 24-28, 2016, 2016, pp. 805–817. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978331
[3] D. Beaver, “Efficient multiparty protocols using circuit randomization,”
in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’91, 11th Annual International
Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, California, USA, August
11-15, 1991, Proceedings, 1991, pp. 420–432. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46766-1 34
[4] A. Ben-Efraim, Y. Lindell, and E. Omri, “Optimizing semi-honest
secure multiparty computation for the internet,” in Proceedings of the
2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, Vienna, Austria, October 24-28, 2016, 2016, pp. 578–590.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978347
[5] D. Bogdanov, M. Niitsoo, T. Toft, and J. Willemson, “High-performance
secure multi-party computation for data mining applications,” Int. J.
Inf. Sec., vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 403–418, 2012. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-012-0177-2
[6] R. Bost, R. A. Popa, S. Tu, and S. Goldwasser, “Machine
learning classification over encrypted data,” in 22nd Annual
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS
2015, San Diego, California, USA, February 8-11, 2015,
2015. [Online]. Available: https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2015/
machine-learning-classification-over-encrypted-data
[7] F. Bourse, M. Minelli, M. Minihold, and P. Paillier, “Fast
homomorphic evaluation of deep discretized neural networks,” in
Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2018 - 38th Annual International
Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 19-23,
2018, Proceedings, Part III, 2018, pp. 483–512. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96878-0 17
[8] M. Byali, A. Joseph, A. Patra, and D. Ravi, “Fast secure computation
for small population over the internet,” in Proceedings of the 2018
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
CCS 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada, October 15-19, 2018, 2018, pp.
677–694. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243784
[9] K. Chida, D. Genkin, K. Hamada, D. Ikarashi, R. Kikuchi, Y. Lindell,
and A. Nof, “Fast large-scale honest-majority MPC for malicious
adversaries,” in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2018 - 38th
Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA,
August 19-23, 2018, Proceedings, Part III, 2018, pp. 34–64. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96878-0 2
[10] K. Chida, K. Hamada, D. Ikarashi, R. Kikuchi, N. Kiribuchi, and
B. Pinkas, “An efficient secure three-party sorting protocol with an
honest majority,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2019/695, 2019,
https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/695.
[11] G. Couteau, T. Peters, and D. Pointcheval, “Encryption switching
protocols,” in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2016 - 36th Annual
International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August
14-18, 2016, Proceedings, Part I, 2016, pp. 308–338. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4 12
[12] I. Damga˚rd, M. Fitzi, E. Kiltz, J. B. Nielsen, and T. Toft,
“Unconditionally secure constant-rounds multi-party computation
for equality, comparison, bits and exponentiation,” in Theory of
Cryptography, Third Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2006,
New York, NY, USA, March 4-7, 2006, Proceedings, 2006, pp. 285–304.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/11681878 15
[13] D. Demmler, T. Schneider, and M. Zohner, “ABY - A framework
for efficient mixed-protocol secure two-party computation,” in
22nd Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium,
NDSS 2015, San Diego, California, USA, February 8-11, 2015,
2015. [Online]. Available: https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2015/
aby---framework-efficient-mixed-protocol-secure-two-party-computation
[14] G. Dessouky, F. Koushanfar, A. Sadeghi, T. Schneider, S. Zeitouni, and
M. Zohner, “Pushing the communication barrier in secure computation
using lookup tables,” in 24th Annual Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium, NDSS 2017, San Diego, California,
USA, February 26 - March 1, 2017, 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2017/ndss-2017-programme/
pushing-communication-barrier-secure-computation-using-lookup-tables/
[15] T. K. Frederiksen, T. P. Jakobsen, and J. B. Nielsen, “Faster maliciously
secure two-party computation using the GPU,” in Security and
Cryptography for Networks - 9th International Conference, SCN 2014,
Amalfi, Italy, September 3-5, 2014. Proceedings, 2014, pp. 358–379.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7 21
[16] R. Gilad-Bachrach, N. Dowlin, K. Laine, K. E. Lauter, M. Naehrig,
and J. Wernsing, “Cryptonets: Applying neural networks to encrypted
data with high throughput and accuracy,” in Proceedings of
the 33nd International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML
2016, New York City, NY, USA, June 19-24, 2016, 2016, pp.
201–210. [Online]. Available: http://jmlr.org/proceedings/papers/v48/
gilad-bachrach16.html
[17] O. Goldreich, The Foundations of Cryptography - Volume 2, Basic
Applications. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
[18] O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson, “How to play any mental
game or A completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority,”
in Proceedings of the 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, 1987, New York, New York, USA, 1987, pp. 218–229.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/28395.28420
[19] E. Hesamifard, H. Takabi, M. Ghasemi, and R. N. Wright,
“Privacy-preserving machine learning as a service,” PoPETs, vol.
2018, no. 3, pp. 123–142, 2018. [Online]. Available: https:
//doi.org/10.1515/popets-2018-0024
[20] C. Juvekar, V. Vaikuntanathan, and A. Chandrakasan, “GAZELLE:
A low latency framework for secure neural network inference,”
in 27th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2018,
Baltimore, MD, USA, August 15-17, 2018., 2018, pp.
1651–1669. [Online]. Available: https://www.usenix.org/conference/
usenixsecurity18/presentation/juvekar
[21] J. Liu, M. Juuti, Y. Lu, and N. Asokan, “Oblivious neural network
predictions via minionn transformations,” in Proceedings of the
2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, CCS 2017, Dallas, TX, USA, October 30 - November 03,
2017, 2017, pp. 619–631. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/
3133956.3134056
[22] X. Liu, R. H. Deng, K. R. Choo, and J. Weng, “An efficient
privacy-preserving outsourced calculation toolkit with multiple keys,”
IEEE Trans. Information Forensics and Security, vol. 11, no. 11, pp.
2401–2414, 2016. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.
2016.2573770
[23] P. Mohassel, O. Orobets, and B. Riva, “Efficient server-aided 2pc for
mobile phones,” PoPETs, vol. 2016, no. 2, pp. 82–99, 2016. [Online].
Available: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/popets.2015.2016.issue-2/
popets-2016-0006/popets-2016-0006.xml
[24] P. Mohassel and P. Rindal, “Aby3: A mixed protocol framework
for machine learning,” in Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2018,
Toronto, ON, Canada, October 15-19, 2018, 2018, pp. 35–52. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243760
[25] P. Mohassel, M. Rosulek, and Y. Zhang, “Fast and secure three-party
computation: The garbled circuit approach,” in Proceedings of the
22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, Denver, CO, USA, October 12-16, 2015, 2015, pp. 591–602.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813705
[26] P. Mohassel and Y. Zhang, “Secureml: A system for scalable privacy-
preserving machine learning,” in 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, SP 2017, San Jose, CA, USA, May 22-26, 2017, 2017,
pp. 19–38. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.12
[27] H. Morita, N. Attrapadung, T. Teruya, S. Ohata, K. Nuida, and
G. Hanaoka, “Constant-round client-aided secure comparison protocol,”
in Computer Security - 23rd European Symposium on Research in
Computer Security, ESORICS 2018, Barcelona, Spain, September 3-7,
2018, Proceedings, Part II, 2018, pp. 395–415. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98989-1 20
[28] T. Nishide and K. Ohta, “Multiparty computation for interval, equality,
and comparison without bit-decomposition protocol,” in Public Key
Cryptography - PKC 2007, 10th International Conference on Practice
and Theory in Public-Key Cryptography, Beijing, China, April
16-20, 2007, Proceedings, 2007, pp. 343–360. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71677-8 23
[29] L. T. Phong, Y. Aono, T. Hayashi, L. Wang, and S. Moriai, “Privacy-
14
preserving deep learning via additively homomorphic encryption,”
IEEE Trans. Information Forensics and Security, vol. 13, no. 5, pp.
1333–1345, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.
2017.2787987
[30] B. Pinkas, T. Schneider, O. Tkachenko, and A. Yanai, “Efficient circuit-
based PSI with linear communication,” in Advances in Cryptology -
EUROCRYPT 2019 - 38th Annual International Conference on the
Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Darmstadt,
Germany, May 19-23, 2019, Proceedings, Part III, 2019, pp. 122–153.
[Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17659-4 5
[31] M. S. Riazi, C. Weinert, O. Tkachenko, E. M. Songhori, T. Schneider,
and F. Koushanfar, “Chameleon: A hybrid secure computation
framework for machine learning applications,” in Proceedings of the
2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
AsiaCCS 2018, Incheon, Republic of Korea, June 04-08, 2018, 2018, pp.
707–721. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/3196494.3196522
[32] A. C. Yao, “How to generate and exchange secrets (extended abstract),”
in 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,
Toronto, Canada, 27-29 October 1986, 1986, pp. 162–167. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.1986.25
[33] S. Zahur, M. Rosulek, and D. Evans, “Two halves make a
whole - reducing data transfer in garbled circuits using half
gates,” in Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2015 - 34th
Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications
of Cryptographic Techniques, Sofia, Bulgaria, April 26-30, 2015,
Proceedings, Part II, 2015, pp. 220–250. [Online]. Available:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46803-6 8
[34] R. Zhu, D. Cassel, A. Sabry, and Y. Huang, “NANOPI: extreme-scale
actively-secure multi-party computation,” in Proceedings of the 2018
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
CCS 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada, October 15-19, 2018, 2018, pp.
862–879. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243850
Appendix
VII. ONE-ROUND Overflow
In this section, we explain another construction of
Overflow. Although we need more computation and data trans-
fer than two-round Overflow in Section IV-B, we can compute
the following Overflow with one communication round (for
slightly small share spaces in practice).
1) Protocol: Let χ[P ] denote a bit that is 1 if the condition
P holds and 0 otherwise. Let Overflow(a, b; c) = χ[a+b ≥ c].
Here, n1 and n2 are parameters with n = n1 + n2:
1) Pi (i ∈ {0, 1}) parses JxKAi = yi || zi where yi is the
n1 most significant bits of xi and zi is the n2 least
significant bits of xi.
2) For each a1 = 1, . . . , 2n1 − 1,
a) P0 sets α
〈a1;1〉
0 ← χ[y0 = a1] and α〈a1;2〉0 ←
0.
b) P1 sets α
〈a1;1〉
1 ← 0 and α〈a1;2〉1 ← χ[y1 ≥
2n1 − a1].
Let Jα〈a1;j〉KB = (α〈a1;j〉0 , α〈a1;j〉1 ) for j = 1, 2.
3) For each a2 = 1, . . . , 2n2 − 1 and j = 0, . . . , n1 − 1,
P0 sets
β
〈a2;j〉
0 ←
{
y0[j] if y0 6= 0 and z0 = a2 ,
1 otherwise,
where y0[j] denotes the j-th bit of y0. P1 sets
β
〈a2;j〉
1 ←
{
y1[j] if y1 6= 0 and z1 ≥ 2n2 − a2 ,
1 otherwise.
Let Jβ〈a2;j〉KB = (β〈a2;j〉0 , β〈a2;j〉1 ).
4) For each a3 = 1, . . . , 2n2 − 1,
a) P0 sets γ
〈a3;1〉
0 ← χ[y0 = 0], γ〈a3;2〉0 ←
χ[y0 = 2
n1 − 1], γ〈a3;3〉0 ← χ[z0 = a3], and
γ
〈a3;4〉
0 ← 0.
b) P1 sets γ
〈a3;1〉
1 ← χ[y1 = 0], γ〈a3;2〉1 ←
χ[y1 = 2
n1 − 1], γ〈a3;3〉1 ← 0, and γ〈a3;4〉1 ←
χ[z1 ≥ 2n2 − a3].
Let Jγ〈a3;j〉KB = (γ〈a3;j〉0 , γ〈a3;j〉1 ) for j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
5) Two parties execute the followings in parallel: For
each a1 = 1, . . . , 2n1 − 1, computeJb〈a1〉1 K ← 2-AND(Jα〈a1;1〉KB, Jα〈a1;2〉KB)
by using 2-AND. For each a2 = 1, . . . , 2n2 − 1,
compute
Jb〈a2〉2 KB ← n1-AND(Jβ〈a2;0〉KB, Jβ〈a2;1〉KB,
. . . , Jβ〈a2;n1−1〉KB)
by using n1-AND. For each a3 = 1, . . . , 2n2 − 1,
compute
Jb〈a3〉3 KB ← 4-AND(Jγ〈a3;1〉K, Jγ〈a3;2〉KB,Jγ〈a3;3〉KB, Jγ〈a3;4〉KB)
by using 4-AND.
6) Pi locally compute
JdKBi ← 2n1−1⊕
a1=1
Jb〈a1〉1 KBi ⊕2n2−1⊕
a2=1
Jb〈a2〉2 KBi ⊕2n2−1⊕
a3=1
Jb〈a3〉3 KBi .
Then Pi output the share JdKBi .
All the steps except Step 5 can be locally executed by
each party. Hence, in total, only 1 round of communication
is required which is spent during Step 5, where (2n1 − 1)
2-ANDs, (2n2 − 1) n1-ANDs, and (2n2 − 1) 4-ANDs are
performed in parallel. For examples, when n = 15 and
(n1, n2) = (8, 7), these are 255 2-ANDs, 127 8-ANDs, and
127 4-ANDs.
2) Correctness: First, we note that an overflow occurs
modulo 2n for (x0, x1) if and only if, either an overflow occurs
modulo 2n1 for (y0, y1), or y0 +y1 = 2n1−1 and an overflow
occurs modulo 2n2 for (z0, z1). As the two events are disjoint,
it follows that
Overflow(x0, x1; 2
n)
= Overflow(y0, y1; 2
n1)
⊕ (χ[y0 + y1 = 2n1 − 1] ∧ Overflow(z0, z1; 2n2)) .
Moreover, we have
χ[y0 + y1 = 2
n1 − 1] =
n1−1∧
j=0
(y0[j]⊕ y1[j]) ,
therefore Overflow(x0, x1; 2n) is the XOR of
Overflow(y0, y1; 2
n1) andn1−1∧
j=0
(y0[j]⊕ y1[j])
 ∧ Overflow(z0, z1; 2n2) . (1)
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For the term Overflow(y0, y1; 2n1), we note that the over-
flow occurs if and only if there is a (in fact, unique) a1 =
1, . . . , 2n1 − 1 satisfying that y0 = a1 and a1 + y1 ≥ 2n1 (i.e.,
y1 ≥ 2n1 − a1). These 2n1 − 1 events are all disjoint. In the
protocol, the bit α〈a1;1〉 is 1 if and only if y0 = a1, and the
bit α〈a1;2〉 is 1 if and only if y1 ≥ 2n1 − a1. Therefore, we
have
Overflow(y0, y1; 2
n1) =
2n1−1⊕
a1=1
α〈a1;1〉∧α〈a1;2〉 =
2n1−1⊕
a1=1
b
〈a1〉
1 .
The same argument implies that, the bit in Eq.(1) is equal to
n1−1∧
j=0
(y0[j] ⊕ y1[j])
 ∧ 2n2−1⊕
a2=1
χ[z0 = a2] ∧ χ[z1 ≥ 2n2 − a2]
=
2n2−1⊕
a2=1

n1−1∧
j=0
(y0[j] ⊕ y1[j])
 ∧ χ[z0 = a2] ∧ χ[z1 ≥ 2n2 − a2]
 .
(2)
To decrease the depth of the circuit in Eq.(2), we consider
to let P0 modify the bits y0[j] in a way that the AND-term
becomes 0 if z0 (known to P0) is not equal to a2. Now
observe that, unless y1 = 0, at least one of the bits y1[j]
is 1, therefore the AND-term would become 0 if all bits y0[j]
were 1. Accordingly, instead of y0[j], we use a bit y′0[j]a2 that
is y0[j] if z0 = a2 and is 1 if z0 6= a2. Then we haven1−1∧
j=0
(y0[j]⊕ y1[j])
 ∧ χ[z0 = a2] ∧ χ[z1 ≥ 2n2 − a2]
=
n1−1∧
j=0
(y′0[j]a2 ⊕ y1[j])
 ∧ χ[z1 ≥ 2n2 − a2]
unless y1 = 0. Similarly, we let P1 modify the bits y1[j] in
a way that the AND-term becomes 0 if z1 (known to P1) is
smaller than 2`2 − a2. Namely, instead of y1[j], we use a bit
y′1[j]a2 that is y1[j] if z1 ≥ 2n2 − a2 and is 1 otherwise. Then
the same argument implies thatn1−1∧
j=0
(y′0[j]a2 ⊕ y1[j])
 ∧ χ[z1 ≥ 2n2 − a2]
=
n1−1∧
j=0
(y′0[j]a2 ⊕ y′1[j]a2)
unless y0 = 0. Summarizing, the bit in Eq.(1) is equal to
2n2−1⊕
a2=1
n1−1∧
j=0
(y′0[j]a2 ⊕ y′1[j]a2)

unless y0 = 0 or y1 = 0.
Now we want to adjust the computation result in the case
where y0 = 0 or y1 = 0. Before doing that, we modify the
computation further in order to simplify the situation: for i =
0, 1, we change the bits y′i[j]a2 in a way that it always becomes
1 when yi = 0. The resulting bit is equal to β
〈a2;j〉
i in the
protocol, and the corresponding computation result
2n2−1⊕
a2=1
n1−1∧
j=0
(β
〈a2;j〉
0 ⊕ β〈a2;j〉1 )
 = 2n2−1⊕
a2=1
n1−1∧
j=0
β〈a2;j〉

=
2n2−1⊕
a2=1
b
〈a2〉
2
(3)
is still equal to the bit in Eq.(1) unless y0 = 0 or y1 = 0. On the
other hand, when y0 = 0 or y1 = 0, the bit in Eq.(3) is equal to
0, as now one of the two vectors (β〈a2;0〉i . . . . , β
〈a2;n1−1〉
i ) (i =
0, 1) is (1, 1, . . . , 1) while the other has at least one component
being 1. When y0 = y1 = 0, the bit in Eq.(1) is also equal to
0 and hence is equal to the bit in Eq.(3) as desired. From now,
we consider the other case where precisely one of y0 and y1
is equal to 0; in the protocol, this is equivalent to γ〈a3;1〉0 ⊕
γ
〈a3;1〉
1 = 1, i.e., γ
〈a3;1〉 = 1. Under the condition, the bit in
Eq.(1) becomes 1 if and only if the other yi which is not equal
to 0 is equal to (11 · · · 1)2 = 2n1 − 1 (i.e., γ〈a3;2〉 = γ〈a3;2〉0 ⊕
γ
〈a3;2〉
1 = 1 in the protocol) and Overflow(z0, z1; 2
n2) = 1. By
expanding the bit Overflow(z0, z1; 2n2) in the same way as the
aforementioned case of Overflow(y0, y1; 2n1), it follows that
the bit in Eq.(1) is equal to
2n2−1⊕
a3=1
γ〈a3;1〉 ∧ γ〈a3;2〉 ∧ γ〈a3;3〉 ∧ γ〈a3;4〉 =
2n2−1⊕
a3=1
b
〈a3〉
3
under the current condition. Note that the bit above is 0 when
the current condition (i.e., precisely one of y0 and y1 is 0) is
not satisfied.
Summarizing the arguments, the bit in Eq.(1) is equal to
2n2−1⊕
a2=1
b
〈a2〉
2 ⊕
2n2−1⊕
a3=1
b
〈a3〉
3
in any case, therefore we have
Overflow(x0, x1; 2
n) =
2n1−1⊕
a1=1
b
〈a1〉
1 ⊕
2n2−1⊕
a2=1
b
〈a2〉
2 ⊕
2n2−1⊕
a3=1
b
〈a3〉
3
= d
as desired. This completes the proof of correctness for the
protocol.
VIII. OTHER EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Here we show the experimental results of our gates and
protocols we omit in Section V.
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pre-comp. online comp. # of comm. data trans. # of comm. comm. online total
time (ms) time (ms) bits (bit) time (ms) rounds latency (ms) exec. time (ms)
0.037 0.020 2× 101 2.5× 10−4 1 40 40.0
2-AND 0.24 0.021 2× 102 2.5× 10−3 1 40 40.0
23.2 0.14 2× 104 2.5× 10−1 1 40 40.4
243.1 1.2 2× 105 2.5 1 40 43.7
0.085 0.033 3× 101 3.75× 10−4 1 40 40.0
3-AND 0.50 0.035 3× 102 3.75× 10−3 1 40 40.0
46.3 0.21 3× 104 3.75× 10−1 1 40 40.6
489.8 1.9 3× 105 3.75 1 40 45.7
0.15 0.055 4× 101 5.0× 10−4 1 40 40.1
4-AND 0.94 0.059 4× 102 5.0× 10−3 1 40 40.1
89.3 0.34 4× 104 5.0× 10−1 1 40 40.8
929.0 2.9 4× 105 5.0 1 40 47.9
0.26 0.096 5× 101 6.25× 10−4 1 40 40.1
5-AND 1.8 0.098 5× 102 6.25× 10−3 1 40 40.1
168.6 0.58 5× 104 6.25× 10−1 1 40 41.2
1763 5.0 5× 105 6.25 1 40 51.3
0.49 0.17 6× 101 7.5× 10−4 1 40 40.2
6-AND 3.4 0.18 6× 102 7.5× 10−3 1 40 40.2
327.8 1.0 6× 104 7.5× 10−1 1 40 41.8
3379 13.1 6× 105 7.50 1 40 60.6
0.96 0.32 7× 101 8.75× 10−4 1 40 40.3
7-AND 6.5 0.34 7× 102 8.75× 10−3 1 40 40.3
644.6 2.0 7× 104 8.75× 10−1 1 40 42.9
6564 27.4 7× 105 8.75 1 40 76.2
1.9 0.67 8× 101 1.0× 10−3 1 40 40.7
8-AND 12.8 0.70 8× 102 1.0× 10−2 1 40 40.7
1274 3.9 8× 104 1.0 1 40 44.9
12868 57.7 8× 105 10.0 1 40 107.7
3.9 1.4 9× 101 1.125× 10−3 1 40 41.4
9-AND 25.3 1.5 9× 102 1.125× 10−2 1 40 41.5
2538 9.9 9× 104 1.125 1 40 51.0
25515 121.7 9× 105 11.25 1 40 173.0
TABLE VIII. EVALUATION OF N-AND WITH 10(TOP)/100(SECOND FROM THE TOP)/10000(THIRD FROM THE TOP)/100000(BOTTOM) BATCH.
pre-comp. online comp. # of comm. data trans. # of comm. comm. online total
time (ms) time (ms) bits (bit) time (ms) rounds latency (ms) exec. time (ms)
5.3 0.52 20× 101 4.75× 10−3 2 80 80.5
Equality 50.3 0.59 20× 102 4.75× 10−2 2 80 80.6
5003 5.6 20× 104 4.75 2 80 90.4
50051 101.2 20× 105 4.75× 101 2 80 228.7
28.1 2.2 712× 101 8.9× 10−2 3 120 122.3
Comparison 266.9 3.2 712× 102 8.9× 10−1 3 120 124.1
27810 138.2 712× 104 8.9× 101 3 120 347.2
282130 2171 712× 105 8.9× 102 3 120 3181
83.5 2.7 3960× 101 2.75× 10−1 4 160 163.0
3-Max 841.3 5.6 3960× 102 2.75 4 160 168.4
86345 631.5 3960× 104 2.75× 102 4 160 1067
863023 7121 3960× 105 2.75× 103 4 160 10031
TABLE IX. EVALUATION OF OUR PROTOCOLS OVER Z232 WITH 10(TOP)/100(SECOND FROM THE TOP)/10000(THIRD FROM THE
TOP)/100000(BOTTOM) BATCH.
17
pre-comp. online comp. # of comm. data trans. # of comm. comm. online total
time (ms) time (ms) bits (bit) time (ms) rounds latency (ms) exec. time (ms)
0.17 0.17 20 2.5× 10−4 2 80 80.2
0.59 0.17 20× 101 2.5× 10−3 2 80 80.2
4.6 0.19 20× 102 2.5× 10−2 2 80 80.2
Equality 46.0 0.36 20× 103 2.5× 10−1 2 80 80.6
447.3 1.8 20× 104 2.5 2 80 84.3
4591 30.5 20× 105 2.5× 101 2 80 135.5
45982 376.9 20× 106 2.5× 102 2 80 706.9
0.95 0.98 280 3.5× 10−3 3 120 121.0
6.4 0.98 280× 101 3.5× 10−2 3 120 121.0
58.3 1.3 280× 102 3.5× 10−1 3 120 121.6
Comparison 598.9 3.7 280× 103 3.5 3 120 127.2
5995 30.5 280× 104 3.5× 101 3 120 185.5
60666 555.7 280× 105 3.5× 102 3 120 1026
607179 5349 280× 106 3.5× 103 3 120 8969
2.5 1.2 1752 2.19× 10−2 4 160 161.2
19.8 1.3 1752× 101 2.19× 10−1 4 160 161.5
189.7 2.4 1752× 102 2.19 4 160 164.6
3-Max 1947 12.0 1752× 103 2.19× 101 4 160 193.9
20121 216.0 1752× 104 2.19× 102 4 160 595.0
199728 2415 1752× 105 2.19× 103 4 160 4765
1976891 22868 1752× 106 2.19× 104 4 160 44928
TABLE X. EVALUATION OF OUR PROTOCOLS OVER Z216 WITH 1 TO 106 BATCH (FROM THE TOP TO THE BOTTOM).
pre-comp. online comp. # of comm. data trans. # of comm. comm. online total
time (ms) time (ms) bits (bit) time (ms) rounds latency (ms) exec. time (ms)
2.5 1.4 72 9.0× 10−4 2 80 81.4
12.7 1.5 72× 101 9.0× 10−3 2 80 81.5
112.9 1.8 72× 102 9.0× 10−2 2 80 81.9
Equality 1152 4.7 72× 103 9.0× 10−1 2 80 85.6
11404 53.4 72× 104 9.0 2 80 142.4
114999 658.8 72× 105 9.0× 101 2 80 828.8
1156086 7862 72× 106 9.0× 102 2 80 8842
22.0 5.8 1900 2.38× 10−2 3 120 125.8
183.3 6.3 1900× 101 2.38× 10−1 3 120 126.5
1819 11.6 1900× 102 2.38 3 120 134.0
Comparison 18894 74.4 1900× 103 2.38× 101 3 120 218.2
186987 975.0 1900× 104 2.38× 102 3 120 1333
1861936 13418 1900× 105 2.38× 103 3 120 15918
19098870 245178 1900× 106 2.38× 104 3 120 269098
58.5 6.3 9348 1.17× 10−1 4 160 166.4
543.7 8.3 9348× 101 1.17 4 160 169.5
5487 23.7 9348× 102 1.17× 101 4 160 195.4
3-Max 56608 270.0 9348× 103 1.17× 102 4 160 547.0
564780 3440 9348× 104 1.17× 103 4 160 4770
5721530 42420 9348× 105 1.17× 104 4 160 54280
− − − − − − −
TABLE XI. EVALUATION OF OUR PROTOCOLS OVER Z264 WITH 1 TO 106 BATCH (FROM THE TOP TO THE BOTTOM). WE CANNOT EXECUTE 3-Max
WITH 1000000 BATCH IN OUR EXPERIMENTS BECAUSE OF THE MEMORY SHORTAGE.
18
